Does the First Amendment Protect Testimony by
Public Employees?
Matt Wolfet
INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment represents a national commitment to the
idea that public discussion is a fundamental principle of American
government and citizenship that must be protected by the law.' The
Supreme Court has recognized several classes of speech that receive
less protection, however, including speech by public employees. The
Court has justified this limitation by concluding that the government
has interests in maintaining control over its employees and an efficient workplace that may, at times, outweigh its employees' interest in
free speech.' One recent case, Garcettiv Ceballos, narrows the class of
public-employee speech that can receive First Amendment protection.
Garcettiprovides that statements made by public employees pursuant
to their official duties are not protected by the First Amendment because such statements owe their existence to the public employees'
professional responsibilities.4
This Comment addresses a recent circuit split concerning whether
and when testimony by public employees is "pursuant to official duties" under Garcetti. It argues that the courts of appeals have not
struck an appropriate balance among the Garcetti holding, a public
employee's duty as a citizen to testify, and the government employer's
interest in maintaining control over its employees. It proposes that the
best way to reconcile these competing interests is to take a closer look
both at how the employee came to testify-as part of his job, under
subpoena, or purely voluntarily-and whether that testimony was given on his employer's behalf. These distinctions allow a line to be
drawn between speech made pursuant to official duties and speech
about official duties. This is the appropriate place to draw such a line
because, on the one hand, the public employer's interest in disciplining
employees for performing their job duties poorly is very strong in light

t

BA 2003, Washington College; JD Candidate 2011, The University of Chicago Law School.

I

See New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254,270 (1964).
See Pickering v Board of Education, 391 US 563,568 (1968).

2

3 547 US 410 (2006).
4

Id at 421.

1473

1474

The University of Chicago Law Review

[77:1473

of the employer's goal of providing efficient public services. On the
other hand, its ability to discipline employees merely for speaking
about things they learned on the job is not as strong, because speaking
about things learned as part of the job does not necessarily implicate
the employee's ability to do his job well.
This Comment suggests an easily administrable solution that
would quell the confusion among the courts of appeals: the speech of a
public employee who testified either voluntarily or under subpoena and
not on behalf of his employer should be protected by the First Amendment and not be deemed unprotected official-duty speech. This rule
would apply regardless of the employee's ordinary job duties. Instead, it
would look to the circumstances of how he came to testify.
The Comment proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the Court's
precedents regarding free speech rights for public employees, the
Garcetti "official duties" standard, and two other duties, the citizen's
ordinary, nonbinding duty to assist in the enforcement of the laws and
the citizen's binding duty to comply with compulsory judicial process.
Part II reviews the split among the courts of appeals. Finally, Part III
proposes that a narrow reading of Garcetti best satisfies the relevant
policy concerns and is consistent with the current judicial doctrine. It
then posits five fact-specific contexts to provide a framework for determining how far the official-duties rule should extend.
I. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND PROTECTIONS

Public employment does not relieve the public employee of the
rights and duties that he would enjoy and be subject to as an ordinary
citizen. The Supreme Court has noted, however, that the public employment context creates situations in which the employee's First
Amendment rights must be balanced against the needs of the government as employer. This Part explores the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the free speech rights of public employees and the potential
conflicts with citizen duties raised by Garcetti.
A. The Free Speech Rights of Public Employees
The Supreme Court has long recognized the critical nature of free
speech protection. It has also, however, allowed the government as
employer a freer hand in regulating the speech of its employees than
the government possesses in regulating the speech of the public at
5 See, for example, New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964) (describing a
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials").
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large. The Court has justified this expansion of government power by
pointing out that when the government is employing someone in order to achieve its goals and duties, the government's interest in regulating speech is "elevated from a relatively subordinate interest" to a
"significant one."'
1. Pickering and Connick: Balancing speech and workplace
efficiency.
Despite its recognition of the government employer's interest in
workplace efficiency, the Supreme Court has recognized that a public
employee retains some free speech rights that may not be contravened by the government as an employer. In Pickering v Board of
Education,' it announced a balancing test for courts to use when deciding whether a public employer's interest in efficient management
of services outweighed the employee's interests as a citizen in commenting on matters of public concern. "The problem," wrote the
Court, "is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."' The
Pickering Court noted that the state, like any other employer, retains
an interest in promoting the efficiency of its services, and may discipline its employees accordingly.! Given the unique position of the public employer, however, it may not restrict all speech.
Applying its test in Pickering, the Court found that the appellant's statements were "upon issues then currently the subject of public attention" and "critical of his ultimate employer.""o The statements
were therefore on matters of public concern, so they were protected
by the First Amendment. The Court went on to conclude that, on the
facts of the case, the public employer's interest in limiting its employees' opportunities to contribute to public debate was "not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any
member of the general public," so the employer could not fire Pickering for his protected speech." In short, Pickering acknowledged the
6

Waters v Churchill, 511 US 661, 675 (1988) (plurality).
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391 US 563 (1968).

8

Id at 568.

9 Id ("[I]t cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the
speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.").
10 Id at 572 (concluding that Pickering, a schoolteacher who had criticized the school
board's alleged misuse of funds in a letter to a newspaper, was uniquely situated to comment
upon how funds allotted to schools should be spent).
11 Pickering, 391 US at 573.
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rights of public employees to comment upon matters of public concern, but was careful to note that these rights remained subject to balancing against the employer's interest in maintaining the efficient
provision of public services. Thus, the public employer remained able
to discipline an employee when its interests in workplace efficiency
outweighed the employee's interests in speaking.
Subsequently, the Court clarified in Connick v Myers" that the "public concern" element is a threshold inquiry. When an employee does not
speak on a matter of public concern, the government employer can act
with wide latitude in making personnel decisions, free from "intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.""
2. Garcetti:Adding a step to reach the "public concern" threshold.
Pickering and Connick remained the leading cases on the free
speech rights of public employees for the next two decades. When
considering allegations that a public employer violated an employee's
First Amendment rights, lower courts regularly looked first to whether
the speech qualified as upon a matter of public concern. If it did qualify, the courts then applied the Pickering balancing test.1
Garcetti was the Court's first major adjustment to the Pickering
doctrine since Connick." The Court held that "when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline." 6
461 US 138 (1983).
Id at 146.
14 The various courts of appeals have developed their own multipart tests for applying the
Pickering doctrine, but they uniformly treat the public concern inquiry as a threshold matter,
applying the balancing test only if the plaintiff was able to meet that threshold. See, for example,
Love-Lane v Martin, 355 F3d 766,776 (4th Cir 2004) (applying a multipart Pickeringtest wherein
the "first question is whether [the plaintiffs] speech was about a matter of public concern"); Cox
v DardanellePublic School District,790 F2d 668,672 (8th Cir 1986) (treating the public concern
inquiry as the first part of a two-step test to determine if an expression is constitutionally protected). For a review of the diverse treatment of the Pickeringdoctrine by the circuits, see Joseph
0. Oluwole, The Pickering Balancing Test and Public Employment-Free Speech Jurisprudence:
12
13

The Approaches of FederalCircuitCourts ofAppeals, 46 Duquesne L Rev 133,145-175 (2008).
1s See, for example, Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti's Impact on the First Amendment Speech

Rights of FederalEmployees, 7 First Amend L Rev 117, 125 (2008) (stating that Garcetti"changes
everything" at the first stage of the Pickering inquiry by making the threshold question one of
whether the employee was acting pursuant to official duties or speaking as a citizen); Emily Gold
Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood's Core:A New Approach to Restrictionson School-Sponsored
Speech, 60 U Fla L Rev 63,82 (2008). But see Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech & Management
Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 Berkeley J Emp & Labor L 175,

211-12 (2008) (arguing that, contrary to the belief of most courts and commentators, Garcetti
"did not add elements to the Pickering-Connicktest" and did not significantly change the analysis of public employees' First Amendment rights).
16 Garcetti,547 US at 421.
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Effectively, this adds another step to the Pickering-Connick framework. Only if an employee did not make statements pursuant to his
official duties does a court even consider whether the speech is protected under Pickering.

In Garcetti,Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attorney, was serving as calendar deputy-a position that involves oversight responsibility, including some supervision of other prosecutors-when he was
asked by a defense attorney to investigate claimed inaccuracies in an
affidavit used to obtain a search warrant. Ceballos investigated the
defense attorney's allegations and decided that the affidavit contained
serious misrepresentations." Ceballos drafted two memoranda exposing the misrepresentations. The first, the "disposition memorandum,"
summarized Ceballos's concerns and recommended that the case be
dismissed. The second was a follow-up memo describing a conversation that Ceballos later had with the warrant affiant." The district attorney's office decided to go forward with the case anyway, and the
defense filed a motion to traverse and called Ceballos. At the motion
hearing, Ceballos testified truthfully about his observations regarding
the affidavit." Ceballos was then allegedly subjected to a series of retaliatory actions, and he sued under § 1983 for violation of his First
Amendment rights.20
In rejecting Ceballos's First Amendment claim, the district court
addressed only the retaliation stemming from Ceballos's speech in the
disposition memorandum, which neither party disputed was prepared
pursuant to Ceballos's official duties as calendar deputy.21 Although the
Ninth Circuit later pointed out that Ceballos alleged that the retaliation
stemmed not only from his submission of the disposition memorandum,
but also from his testimony and his other allegations of misconduct,2
the district court did not address the testimony, the second memorandum, or any of Garcetti's other speech. The court of appeals reversed,
again addressing only the speech in the disposition memorandum.3
17 Id at 414-15. The defense attorney's request and Ceballos's subsequent investigation
were characterized by Ceballos as fairly routine parts of the calendar deputy's job. See id.
18 Id at 414.
19 Id at 414-15.
20 See Garcetti,547 US at 415 (describing the retaliatory actions as including "reassignment
from his calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another courthouse, and
denial of a promotion").
21 See Ceballos v Garcetti, 2002 WL 34098285, *5-6 (CD Cal) (granting summary judgment
to the employer on the First Amendment claim). See also Garcetti, 547 US at 424.
22
See Ceballos v Garcetti, 361 F3d 1168,1171 (9th Cir 2004).
23 See id at 1173 ("we hold that, for purposes of summary judgment, Ceballos's allegations
of wrongdoing in the memorandum constitute protected speech under the First Amendment;
accordingly, we need not determine here whether similar protection should be afforded to his
other communications. Those matters are best explored at trial.").
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His case wound up in the Supreme Court, which, like the lower
courts, addressed only the retaliation for the disposition memorandum. It held that Ceballos did not speak as a citizen when he wrote
the disposition memorandum because he wrote it "pursuant to his
duties as a calendar deputy. ... [Writing the memo was] part of what

he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to do."24 Although the Court
acknowledged that "public employees do not surrender all their First
Amendment rights by reason of their employment," it noted that the
Pickering doctrine protects a public employee's right to speak as a
citizen addressing matters of public concern only "in certain circumstances."2 The Court reiterated the dual nature of the ConnickPickering inquiry: the test begins by determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If the employee did so speak, only then does the balancing test apply.26
Importantly, the Court did not even reach the question of whether the content of Ceballos's memorandum involved a matter of public
concern. Instead, it determined that because Ceballos was "simply
performing his ... job duties, there [was] no warrant" for application
of the Pickering balancing test.27 In effect, the Court added an extra
step that precedes the test's traditional public concern prong: if the
employee spoke as part of his official duties, it does not matter whether he spoke on a matter of public concern.
The Court distinguished employees speaking pursuant to their
official duties from employees "who make public statements outside
the course of performing their official duties," like writing a letter to a
newspaper or discussing politics with a coworker,' because those employees are engaged in the "kind of activity engaged in by citizens who
do not work for the government."" The Court justified its limit on constitutional protection by pointing out that declining to protect official24

25

Garcetti, 547 US at 421.
Id at 417.

26
See id at 418 (noting that if the employee spoke on a matter of public concern, the
"question becomes whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for
treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public").
27 Id at 423 (explaining that "to hold otherwise would be to demand permanent judicial
intervention in the conduct of governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound
principles of federalism and the separation of powers").
28 Most courts and commentators agree that despite the Court's reference to the "dual
nature" of the Connick-Pickering inquiry, the Garcetti rule effectively adds an extra step. See
Huppert v City of Pittsburg, 574 F3d 696, 702 (9th Cir 2009) (collecting cases and noting that
"[olur sister circuits and the Supreme Court have said that the question whether the plaintiff
acted pursuant to his or her job duties is antecedent to a determination whether the plaintiff
spoke regarding a matter of public concern"). But see Dale, 29 Berkeley J Emp & Labor L at
211-12 (cited in note 15).

29 Garcetti, 547 US at 423.
30

Id.
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duty speech does not "infringe any liberties the employee might have
enjoyed as a private citizen."" It added that "a powerful network of
legislative enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and
labor codes"-are available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing,
removing the need for constitutional protection.32
In sum, Garcetti sets up a new obstacle that public employees
who seek to prove that their speech is constitutionally protected must
clear. It adds to the traditional public concern prerequisite a requirement that the speech was not made pursuant to their official duties.
Only by clearing both of these hurdles can employees reach the Pickering balancing test.
The Duties of Testifying Public Employees

B.

Garcetti recognized the public employee's obligation to perform
his job duties, and discouraged judicial interference with the public
employer-public employee relationship. The citizen has other, potentially conflicting duties, however. These include the ordinary, nonbinding duty of the citizen to assist law enforcement as well as the binding
duty of the citizen who is subpoenaed to testify. Garcetti did not answer several questions that this conflict implicates. What activities are
''pursuant to official duties"? Does "pursuant to official duties" include speech that was not necessarily part of the employee's job duties, such as speech about issues that the employee knew about because of his job? And when official duties conflict with citizen duties,
which control?
1. Official duties under Garcetti.
Prior to Garcetti, the courts of appeals to consider the issue all
acknowledged that the First Amendment potentially could protect
testimonial speech by public employees concerning issues they
learned about at work." In considering whether such testimony was
protected speech, the courts of appeals typically focused on the content
of the testimony, as well as its form and context, with the aim of ultimately determining whether the speech was upon a matter of public
concern. " After Garcetti,the calculus has changed. Now the question is

31
32

Id at 421-22.
Id at 425-26.

33
See Scott E. Michael, Comment, "Lie or Lose Your Job!" Protecting a Public Employee's
FirstAmendment Right to Testify Truthfully, 29 Hamline L Rev 413,425-37 (2006) (reviewing the

courts of appeals' pre-Garcetti treatment of testimony by public employees in the context of
defining "public concern").
3
See, for example, Pro v Donatucci, 81 F3d 1283,1291 (3d Cir 1996).
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not just about the content, form, and context of the speech, but also
about whether the speech was made pursuant to official duties. If the
testimony was made pursuant to official duties, Garcetti forecloses
First Amendment protection.
The Garcetti Court apparently equated official duties with job duties. It focused on the idea that restricting speech that "owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen."" The principle seems clear: because a public employee who
speaks as part of his official duties does not engage in "free" speech,
but instead in speech required by his job duties, his speech is not protected by the Constitution. How far this principle extends, however, is
less clear. Does it reach all speech that could never have occurred in
the absence of the employer-employee relationship- that is, speech
about one's official duties?
2. The citizen's duty to testify when subpoenaed.
Irrespective of First Amendment protections, the Court has also
recognized the existence of "duties" in many other situations. One
duty that the Court has previously acknowledged in the First
Amendment context is the ordinary citizen's "duty" to assist in the
enforcement of the laws. The Court has made clear that this duty is a
major part of the adversary system: the "conviction that private citizens have a duty to provide assistance to law enforcement officials
when it is required is by no means foreign to our traditions."" Thus
property owners, for example, in some circumstances can be forced to
cooperate with government investigations that require the government's use of private property."
The First Amendment does not necessarily provide a shield from
these citizen duties: indeed, individuals may be compelled to speak by
them." This is in contrast to the general rule that the government typically cannot force a person to speak, even when that speech would

35
36

Garcetti, 547 US at 421-22.
United States v New York Telephone Co, 434 US 159, 175 n 24 (1977) (collecting cases in

which such a duty was recognized). See also Branzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665, 696 (1972) (noting
with approval the federal misprision statute, which makes it a crime to knowingly fail to report
the commission of a felony); In re Quarles, 158 US 532,535 (1895) ("It is the duty and the right,
not only of every peace officer of the United States, but of every citizen, to assist in prosecuting,
and in securing the punishment of, any breach of the peace of the United States.").
37

See New York Telephone, 434 US at 174.

See Branzburg, 408 US at 682-91 (noting that the "public has a right to every man's
evidence" and that the First Amendment does not protect the average citizen from having to
disclose information).
38
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assist a government investigation or support a government policy."
This is the role of the subpoena. A person who voluntarily complied
with the citizen's duty to assist in law enforcement would not be complying with any binding legal duty. His speech would likely be "free"
speech protected by the First Amendment. But the subpoena, like the
public employee's job obligation, converts a citizen's "duty" of assistance in law enforcement into a mandatory obligation -a legal duty, as
opposed to an ordinary one.
Therefore, the ordinary, nonbinding "duty" of the citizen converts
to a legal duty when the judicial system uses compulsory process. "It is
... beyond controversy that one of the duties which the citizen owes
his government is to support the administration of justice by attending
its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is properly summoned."4 Legislatures "may provide for the performance of this duty
and prescribe penalties for its disobedience,"" and have done so via,
for example, the federal statute giving courts the power to punish criminally those who fail to comply with a subpoena.42 The Court has
routinely required citizens to testify and otherwise to assist in the
judicial process,43 has blessed the punishment of citizens who fail to
comply with the judicial process," and has carved out only narrow exceptions to this legal duty.4'

39

See, for example, West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 642

(1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.").
4
Blackmer v United States, 284 US 421,438 (1932).
41 Id.
42 See 18 USC § 401(3) (giving any federal court the power to punish those who fail to
comply with a lawful "writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command").
43 See, for example, Cohen v Cowles Media Co, 501 US 663, 669 (1991) (holding that "all
citizens" share an obligation to respond to subpoenas and answer questions related to criminal
investigations); United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 713 (1974) (requiring the President to comply
with a subpoena and holding that a generalized interest in confidentiality does not overcome the
demands of due process in a criminal trial).
44 See, for example, Blackmer, 284 US at 438 (affirming the contempt conviction of a citizen who failed to comply with a subpoena).
45 Some of the most prominent of these exceptions include the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, the congressional privilege stemming from the Speech or Debate
Clause, and the executive privilege. The Court has narrowly construed these privileges and explicitly traced several of them to the Constitution. See, for example, Miranda v Arizona, 384 US
436, 467 (1966) (pointing to the Fifth Amendment as conferring a privilege against selfincrimination); Gravel v United States, 408 US 606, 615-16 (1972) (stating that the Speech or
Debate Clause exempts members of Congress from being questioned about their activities in
Congress); Nixon, 418 US at 711-12 (noting that the general privilege of confidentiality of executive communications is "constitutionally based," but balancing it against "the guarantee of due
process of law" and the "basic function of the courts"). The Court has also acknowledged that
other privileges can be established by state statute or common law. See Maness v Meyers, 419 US
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Thus, a citizen's ordinary, nonbinding "duty" to assist in the enforcement of the laws is different from his legal duty to appear in
court when compelled. This distinction is important when one applies
Garcetti to public-employee testimony. While Garcetti established
that the judiciary should not interfere with public employer-public
employee relations, it did not address a possible tension that arises
when the citizen's duty to testify is implicated. The principle of Garcetti is that whenever a public employee is compelled by his job duties to
testify, he does not speak as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.
But when the public employee is compelled to testify by a subpoena,
he has a binding citizen's duty to comply with the subpoena that may
conflict with his official duties as a government employee.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: IS A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE'S

TESTIMONY PROTECTED?
The courts of appeals have varied in their approaches to how
Garcetti should be applied when public employees testify. Some have
read official duties very narrowly, while others have read it more
broadly. The courts of appeals have also varied in the attention that
they have paid to potential conflicts between citizen duties and "official duties." Accordingly, a circuit split has arisen over the circumstances in which a public employee's testimonial speech is protected by
the First Amendment. This Part explores the different approaches of
the courts of appeals that have considered the issue.
A.

Reilly: The Third Circuit Protects All Testimony

In Reilly v City ofAtlantic City," the Third Circuit concluded that a
public employee's testimony made pursuant to his official duties still
could qualify as protected speech post-Garcetti.o In Reilly, the plaintiff,
an Atlantic City police detective, "initiated and took part in" an investigation into corruption in the Atlantic City Police Department, and testified for the prosecution at the criminal trial of a fellow officer.4 Several
years after the trial, Officer Robert Reilly was subjected to allegedly
retaliatory actions that forced his early retirement. After retiring, Reilly
sued, alleging violations of his First Amendment right to speak about
449, 461 n 8 (1975) (pointing out that such other privileges include the priest-penitent, lawyerclient, and doctor-patient privileges).
4
532 F3d 216 (3d Cir 2008).
47
See id at 230-31.
4
Complaint, Reilly v City ofAtlantic City, No 03-5975,1W 14-15 (D NJ filed Dec 16,2003)
("Reilly Complaint") (stating that Reilly investigated allegations that two police department
employees exorted money from prostitutes and committed acts of theft, assault, and brutality).
See also Reilly, 532 F3d at 220.
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matters of public concern.4 1 On appeal post-Garcetti, the defendants
argued that Reilly's testimony was made pursuant to his official duties,
and therefore was not protected by the First Amendment.'
The Third Circuit held that Reilly's testimony was protected as a
matter of law. The court began by acknowledging Garcetti's officialduties test. In doing so, the Third Circuit looked to Reilly's job duties,
noting that "Reilly's trial testimony[] appears to have stemmed from
his official duties in the investigation."" It would seem, then, that a
faithful application of Garcetti would have led the Third Circuit to the
conclusion that Reilly's testimony was not protected.
The Reilly court sidestepped the official-duties test, however, by
pointing out that Garcetti did not address trial testimony. Because
Garcetti offered no explicit instruction regarding the testimony of public employees, the Third Circuit turned instead to what it termed "settled principles."52 The court noted that every citizen owes his government the "duty" of giving truthful testimony. It then held that Reilly's
speech could be protected despite Garcetti because when Reilly testified, he "spoke as a citizen."" Thus, even though Reilly's court appearance "stemmed from" his official duties, the Third Circuit held that
Reilly spoke "as a citizen" upon a matter of public concern; this allowed the court to apply the Pickering balancing test, which it determined favored Reilly.
Reilly's result is called into question by the holding and purposive
implications of Garcetti, as well as by the decisions of the Seventh,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits discussed below. The Reilly court noted
that the Garcetti rule created a conflict with the citizen's duty to testify." All of the cases that the Third Circuit relied on, however, dealt
with the citizen's legal duty to testify under or answer a subpoena."
See Reilly, 532 F3d at 222.
See id at 226-27.
s
Id at 231.
52
Id.
53
Reilly, 532 F3d at 228-31.
54 See id at 232 ("[T]he District Court properly held that the public's interest in hearing
testimony about police corruption outweighed Appellants' interest in maintaining order by
disciplining Reilly for that speech.").
55 See id at 231 (asserting that although Reilly's "official responsibilities provided the
initial impetus to appear in court," this was "immaterial to [his] independent obligation as a
citizen to testify truthfully").
56 See id at 228-29, citing United States v Mandujano, 425 US 564, 575-76 (1976) (refusing
to suppress subpoenaed grand jury testimony given without a Miranda warning); United States v
Nixon, 418 US 683, 709 (1974) (ruling that presidential privilege did not allow the President to
refuse to comply with a subpoena); United States v Calandra,414 US 338, 345 (1974) (declining
to apply the exclusionary rule to prevent subpoenaed grand jury testimony); Branzburg v Hayes,
408 US 665, 686 (1972) (requiring journalists to comply with subpoenas); Piemonte v United
States, 367 US 556, 559, 561 (1961) (affirming the detention of a convict who refused to testify
49

50
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The court never distinguished between the citizen's ordinary duty to
assist in law enforcement and his binding duty to comply with a subpoena; it never addressed whether Reilly was subpoenaed to testify, or
whether he did so voluntarily. Instead, it just read Garcetti extremely
narrowly in order to avoid what it saw as an irreconcilable conflict. In
fact, the Third Circuit's reading of Garcetti may be too narrow: if Garcetti exists to bar suits by public employees alleging violations of their
First Amendment rights anytime those employees spoke pursuant to
their official duties, Reilly impermissibly circumvents that rule by concluding that Reilly's testimony was protected even though it was given
pursuant to his official duties.
B.

The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits Do Not Protect Testimony
Pursuant to Official Duties
1. Huppert:The Ninth Circuit expressly declines to follow Reilly.
In Huppert v City of Pittsburg,"the Ninth Circuit, over a dissent by

Judge William Fletcher, applied the plain rule of Garcetti and held that
subpoenaed testimony made pursuant to official duties is not protected
by the First Amendment., Ron Huppert, a police officer, was subpoenaed and testified before a grand jury that was probing corruption in his
police department. Huppert was just one of several officers who was subpoenaed and testified before the grand jury. According to Huppert, not
all of the officers subpoenaed were whistleblowers like himself; indeed,
he was identified by the chief of police as a potentially "bad witness,"
which Huppert understood to reflect a view that he was a "malcontent."s9
This view, he claimed, stemmed from the fact that he had previously
worked on and cooperated with other internal investigations.
Huppert filed a § 1983 suit claiming that he was subjected to retaliation for his testimony -a violation of his First Amendment rights.
The Ninth Circuit applied Garcetti in affirming the dismissal of Huppert's claim, pointing out that Garcetti "drew a distinct line between

before a grand jury even after a subpoena and a grant of immunity); New York v O'Neill, 359 US
1, 11 (1959) (allowing one state to compel another state's citizen to travel across state lines and
testify); Blackmer v United States, 284 US 421, 438 (1932) (upholding contempt charge against a
United States citizen living in France who failed to respond to a subpoena); Blair v United States,
250 US 273, 281 (1919) (affirming contempt charges against witnesses who refused to testify
before a grand jury under subpoena).
57 574 F3d 696 (9th Cir 2009).
58 See id at 707-08.
59 td at 700.
6o See id.
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speech pursuant to one's job duties and speech in a private capacity."
It also expressly refused to follow Reilly. The Ninth Circuit pointed
out that the Third Circuit's Reilly holding implied that truthful testimony could never be part of a police officer's official duties for the
purposes of the Garcetti test. "By first finding that Reilly's speech was
pursuant to his job duties, but subsequently concluding that it was protected by the First Amendment, the Reilly court impermissibly began
chipping away at the plain holding in [Garcetti]."62
In short, the Huppert majority applied a strict interpretation of
Garcetti to truthful testimony: testimony made as part of a public employee's official duties is never protected. In its view," [t]estifying before
a grand jury charged with investigating corruption is one part of an officer's job" regardless of the circumstances under which the officer appeared.V It does not matter whether the officer was the lead investigator, an allegedly corrupt cop, or a whistleblower. Thus, Huppert's subpoenaed testimony was not protected by the First Amendment."
In dissent, Judge Fletcher, relying in part on Reilly, argued that
Huppert's testimony was protected as a matter of law. "[W]here there
is an independent legal duty to speak ... the employee has First

Amendment protection for truthful speech uttered in performance of
that independent legal duty. ... When he appeared before the grand

jury, Huppert acted as a citizen."" He went on to suggest a narrow
holding that would have preserved the "sound policy" of protecting
police officers' testimony: "when an officer testifies before a grand
jury pursuant to a subpoena concerning corruption of his or her fellow
officers, the officer is not performing an official duty."6
Judge Fletcher left open the question of how a citizen's "independent legal duty" comes about. By pointing to the subpoenaed nature of Huppert's testimony, he suggested that compulsory testimony
represents an "independent legal duty" that should be protected. By
arguing that Huppert's speech was protected as a matter of law and
relying on Reilly in doing so, however, Judge Fletcher seemed to suggest that all testimonial speech is protected speech that satisfies both
the Garcetti and Connick prongs of the tripartite test.

61 Huppert, 574 F3d at 708-09 (distinguishing the cases relied upon by the dissent because,
in those cases, the testimony was held not to be part of the plaintiffs' official duties).
62
Id at 708, citing Reilly, 532 F3d at 230-31.
63
Huppert, 574 F3d at 707-08.
See id.
64
65
Id at 721-22 (Fletcher dissenting) (quotation marks omitted).
66 Id at 722.
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2. Green:The Eleventh Circuit treats testimonial speech like
ordinary speech.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Huppert echoed that of the Eleventh Circuit in an earlier case. In Green v Barrett," the Eleventh Circuit held that a public employee's testimony receives no special treatment, and therefore does not qualify as protected speech if it is made
pursuant to the employee's official duties." Shirlie Green, the chief
jailer of a county jail, appeared at an emergency court hearing regarding the appropriateness of the jail as a holding place for high-security
prisoners. Green never claimed that she was subpoenaed, but she did
initially assert that, because she held the position of chief jailer, she
was "required" to testify at that hearing. Later, on appeal postGarcetti,Green changed her tune to argue that her testimony was not
part of her official duties.o
In any event, Green testified that "many of the cell door locks
were either broken or could be easily jammed by prisoners, including
locks in the area of the jail used to house high-security prisoners," that
"prisoners regularly let themselves out of the cells at night," and that
the jail was "unsafe."" Green was fired the next day, ostensibly because her testimony exposed major problems with her management of
the jail.7 Green sued, arguing that the firing violated her First
Amendment rights.
The court of appeals rejected her claim, holding that because
Green's testimony was given "as part of her duties as a public employee," it was unprotected regardless of its status as testimony." In
doing so, it relied on Garcetti as well as pre-GarcettiEleventh Circuit
precedent holding that testimony does not automatically qualify as
speech on a matter of public concern, and that the fact that speech was

226 Fed Appx 883 (11th Cir 2007).
Id at 886.
69 See Amended Complaint, Green v Barrett, No 1:04-CV-00014,1 18 (ND Ga filed Mar 24,
2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 2560796) ("Because Green was then the Chief Jailer,
she was required to testify at [the emergency] hearing on behalf of the Sheriffs Department
regarding circumstances at the jail.").
70 See Brief of the Appellee, Green v Barrett, No 06-15104-BB, *16 (11th Cir filed Dec 4,
2006) (available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 4127031) (stating that her "obligation to testify in court
was independent of any duty she owed to her employer").
71 Green, 226 Fed Appx at 884.
72 See id (noting that Green's employer told a local newspaper that she fired Green because the testimony exposed problems at the jail); Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, Green v Barrett, No 07-177, *4 (US filed Sep 12, 2007) (arguing that Green was fired
because her testimony convinced the employer of her incompetence as chief jailer).
73 Green, 226 Fed Appx at 886.
67

68
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testimonial has no impact on the protected status of the speech.7 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit focuses on the content, form, and context of
the speech." Since the Eleventh Circuit does not grant special status to
testimony, it applied Garcetti in a straightforward manner: the speech
was unprotected because it was part of Green's official duties.
C. The Seventh Circuit is Ambiguous about Garcetti'sEffect
Three recent cases from the Seventh Circuit address the conflict
between the official-duties rule and public employees' duty to testify
as citizens. These cases fail, however, to solve the problem of determining Garcetti's broad effect. It remains unclear in what circumstances the Seventh Circuit would provide First Amendment protection to testimony by public employees.
1. Morales and Tamayo:The Seventh Circuit addresses
legislative and civil testimony.
In Morales v Jones," the Seventh Circuit held that a police officer's subpoenaed testimony in a civil deposition about events that occurred while he was on the job was protected speech because giving
subpoenaed testimony in a civil deposition is not part of an officer's
official duties." Alfonso Morales, a Milwaukee police officer, was subpoenaed to give a deposition in another officer's civil suit for alleged
retaliation. He complied with the subpoena and testified about a possible incident of retaliation by Milwaukee's chief of police." Morales
was then transferred from one department to another; he alleged that
the transfer was retribution for complying with the subpoena and giving the deposition.
On appeal after Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit noted that Morales's testimony was "about speech he made pursuant to his official
duties."" The court held, however, that his deposition was protected
speech: "[b]eing deposed in a civil suit pursuant to a subpoena was

74
See id ("[I]f a plaintiff speaks as part of her duties as a public employee, the speech is
not protected by the First Amendment. This distinction is not affected by the fact that the plaintiff made the statements in testimony."), citing Garcetti, 547 US at 420; Morris v Crow, 142 F3d
1379,1382-83 (11th Cir 1998).
75
See Green, 226 Fed Appx at 886 ("The key consideration is the purpose of the communication."). See also Lyon v Ashurst, 2009 WL 3725364, *1-2 (11th Cir) (deciding that subpoenaed testimony in an employment grievance was not a matter of public concern because it was
"personal to" the employee and the grievant).
76 494 F3d 590 (7th Cir 2007).
77
See id at 598.
78
See id at 595,598.
79
Id at 598 (emphasis added).
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unquestionably not one of Morales' job duties because it was not part
of what he was employed to do.""
Concurring that Morales's deposition speech was protected, Judge
Ilana Rovner agreed that the civil deposition was not part of Morales's
job duties: "Although the subject matter of the deposition related to
information Lt. Morales learned on his job, his testimony owed its existence not to his job but rather to a subpoena in a lawsuit."" Judge
Rovner emphasized that "the fact that [Morales's] speech concerned
the subject matter of his employment is not dispositive.""
The Morales opinion is as notable for what it does not address as
what it does. Morales was deposed to testify in a civil suit, and the
court made clear that subpoenaed testimony by a police officer in a
civil suit is not part of the officer's official duties. Although both the
majority and dissent in Morales noted that Morales was subpoenaed,
neither refined the key element that made Morales's testimony protected speech. Was it that he was subpoenaed, that he testified in a
civil suit, or that he testified at all?
Additionally, Morales says nothing about whether court testimony given as part of one's job is protected. For example, would a police
officer's testimony on behalf of the government in a criminal proceeding stemming from an investigation in which that officer took part be
protected?" Another post-Garcetti Seventh Circuit case indicates that
it would not be. In Tamayo v Blagojevich,n the interim administrator of
the Illinois Gaming Board, Jeannette Tamayo, was removed from her
position after testifying at a legislative hearing about the governor and
his staff's alleged interference with the board's operations. Affirming
the district court's dismissal of her First Amendment claim, the Seventh
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs argument that her testimony was given
outside the scope of her employment. Since the testimony was given
Morales, 494 F3d at 598.
81 Id at 603 (Rovner concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id at 602 (arguing that Garcetti reaffirmed the principle that some public-employee
8
speech related to the speaker's job is protected). When it afforded protection to Morales's subpoenaed civil testimony, the majority implicitly acknowledged that speech about things learned
on the job can be protected. See id at 598 (majority) (holding that civil deposition testimony
about what happened on the job is protected).
83 The Seventh Circuit has applied this reasoning in similar contexts. See Fairley v Fermaint, 482 F3d 897,899-902 (7th Cir 2007) ("Fairley P') (concluding that testimony in prisoners'
civil suits isnot part of prison guards' job duties); Matrisciano v Randle, 569 F3d 723,731 (7th Cir
2009) (determining that a high-ranking prison official who took a day off to testify on behalf of
an inmate at a parole hearing did not act pursuant to his official duties), abrogated on other
a

grounds, Gross v FBL Financial Services Inc, 129 S Ct 2343 (2009).
8
Consider Reilly, 532 F3d at 230 (analyzing Morales and focusing on the non-job-related
aspect of Morales's testimony, and distinguishing it from a situation in which testifying was part
of the employee's official duties).
8
526 F3d 1074 (7th Cir 2008).
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"because of the position she held within the agency" and "about matters within the scope of her job duties as Interim Administrator," Tamayo's testimonial speech was not protected by the First Amendment."
This suggests a willingness in the Seventh Circuit to apply Garcetti's bar on First Amendment protection to testimony given pursuant to
job duties. Although the Seventh Circuit has not yet ruled whether
court testimony given pursuant to one's job duties is protected speech
or considered the role of compulsory process in such testimony, one
can easily imagine the Seventh Circuit applying the reasoning of Tamayo to come down on the side of the defendant in a case with facts
like those in Reilly. It remains uncertain, however, where exactly the
Seventh Circuit would draw the line between testimony pursuant to
official duties and testimony about official duties.
2. Fairley II: Employers must not influence testimony.
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit dealt with this issue in Fairleyv
Andrewsn ("Fairley II"). There, the Seventh Circuit held that threats
made by a public employer to deter its employees from complying
with a subpoena could constitute a violation of the First Amendment."
The case arose when guards at a county jail quit and then sued, alleging harassment by their coworkers for saying that they would testify
truthfully if they were subpoenaed to testify in a civil suit brought by
prisoners alleging abuse.
In reversing the district court's dismissal of the guards' First
Amendment claims, Judge Frank Easterbrook stated that a public
employer may not attempt to restrain its employees' testimony. In
doing so, he did not draw a distinction between official-duty and nonofficial-duty testimony. Instead, he offered the broad proposition that
"[t]estifying against the Jail might not be part of the job, but that
doesn't matter. ... [A government] [t]hreatening penalties for future
speech . . .is the quintessential first-amendment violation."'O

This statement suggests two things. First, that compelled testimony is protected by the First Amendment; second, that government restraints on testimonial speech are a violation of the First Amendment
86 Id at 1092 (ruling that the plaintiff "cannot escape the strictures of Garcetti by including
in her complaint the conclusory legal statement that she testified 'as a citizen ... outside the
duties of her employment"') (ellipsis in original).
87 578 F3d 518 (7th Cir 2009).
88 See id at 524-25.
89 See id at 520-21.
90 Id at 524-25. The court also noted that both retaliation and "prior restraint" (threatening
penalties for future speech) are First Amendment violations; in other words, that whether punitive
measures precede or succeed the speech is immaterial for First Amendment purposes. See id at 525.
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regardless of whether the speech was made as part of the speaker's
official duties. But notwithstanding the force of Judge Easterbrook's
opinion, the effect of Fairley II is uncertain. In an earlier iteration of
the Fairley case, the court held that assisting prisoners with civil litigation was not part of a prison guard's job duties." Thus, Judge Easterbrook's statement that it "doesn't matter" whether the testimony was
part of the guards' duties was not necessary to the FairleyII holdingin short, it was dicta. Moreover, Judge Easterbrook's broad proposition may conflict with his own reading of Garcetti given in the same
opinion: "Garcetti holds that the first amendment does not protect
statements made as part of one's job."9
D.

The State of the Law Is Uncertain

Fairley IPs position that the government may never restrain its
employees' testimony also underlies the Third Circuit's stance in Reilly, but is in conflict with the positions of the other courts of appeals,
and possibly with Tamayo. After Garcetti,can a broad notion that all
testimony is protected from government retaliation coexist with government jobs that require employees to testify? On the other hand,
Huppert and Green may read Garcetti more broadly than is appropriate, thus unnecessarily creating a catch-22 for the public employee
subpoenaed to testify: either testify and expose oneself to retaliation,
or refuse to testify and face contempt charges and other consequences.
These varying positions leave testifying employees in the dark as to
whether their testimonial speech will be protected.
III. COURTS SHOULD PROTECT SUBPOENAED AND
VOLUNTARY TESTIMONY

The courts of appeals' varying applications of Garcetti's officialduties test leave open the question of when a public employee's testimonial speech is protected. This Part evaluates the various situations
that implicate Garcetti and its impact on testimonial speech. It argues
that the courts should adopt a rule that public employees who testify
either voluntarily or under subpoena and not on behalf of their government employers engage in protected speech.
This Part lays out the theoretical justifications for such a rule,
concluding that a narrow, but respectful, reading of Garcetti as it pertains to testimony will preserve critical First Amendment protection
for citizen testimony, which is integral to the judicial process, while
91 See Fairley 1,482 F3d at 902.
92 Fairley II,578 F3d at 522,524

(citation omitted).
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also protecting public employers' ability to discipline employees. Additionally, such a rule would be easy to administer, thereby quelling
the confusion that currently reigns in the courts of appeals. This Part
then outlines a new framework for dealing with public employee testimony after Garcetti by breaking down the types of testimonial
speech into five distinct categories and considering the proper application of the above principles within each category.
A Narrow Reading of GarcettiBest Serves the Various Interests
at Stake

A.

Courts should adopt a narrow reading of Garcetti, applying it only to a small and specific class of public-employee testimony. Specifically, when public employees testify, courts should apply Garcetti's
official-duties rule only to testimony given on behalf of the government as part of the public employee's job duties. To ensure that this
application is consistent, courts should adopt a rule that public employees who testify either voluntarily or under subpoena and not on
the behalf of their government employers engage in protected speech.
In contrast to the regime set out by the Ninth Circuit in Huppert,
speech about information that a public employee happens to learn
about at work should be protected if that speech is given pursuant to
the employee's duty as a citizen to testify when subpoenaed.
1. Protecting subpoenaed and voluntary testimony is consistent
with Garcetti.

Garcetti holds that "when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not
insulate their communications from employer discipline." 93 It seems to
equate official duties with job duties.9
A reading of Garcetti in which speech "pursuant to official duties" is only that speech that is required by the employee's job duties
is the right reading for two reasons. First, this reading is consistent
with Garcetti because Garcettiis best understood to acknowledge that
speech pursuant to official duties is different from speech about official duties. Garcetti requires that speech given pursuant to official duties not be protected by the First Amendment: Ceballos did not speak
93
94

Garcetti,547 US at 421.

See id at 421-22 (noting that Garcetti wrote the disposition memorandum as part of his
job responsibility to "advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case" and
pointing out that speech that "owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen").
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as a citizen because he was required to write the disposition memorandum as part of his job. The government employer must have the
ability to decide to discipline its employees for doing their jobs poorly-even when those jobs include testifying on the government's behalf. This is the point of Garcetti' and the Third Circuit erred when it
evaded a faithful application of this principle in Reilly.
Garcetti expressly recognized, however, that Pickering survived
the Court's narrowing of the protections given to public employees'
speech." This shows that the Court understood that public employees
remain uniquely qualified to comment on certain matters upon which
they acquire expertise as part of their official duties. Speech concerning such matters is speech about official duties, not pursuantto official
duties within the meaning of Garcetti. Thus, testimony "pursuant to
official duties" should be understood to be only testimony that is given on the government's behalf as part of the testifying employee's
ordinary job duties.
Second, a narrow reading of Garcetti is consistent with the idea,
long acknowledged by the Court, that citizens are bound by certain
duties, including the duty to testify when compelled. Public employees
have duties as citizens in addition to their official duties as government employees. The vital importance of these other citizen duties
counsels that Garcetti's official-duties test not be read too broadly. Just
as the exceptions to the general duty of citizens to testify and otherwise comply with law enforcement are "not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth,"9
Garcettishould be read narrowly, so as not to interfere with the traditional duties of the citizen.
When the testifying employee is a "professional testifier"-that is,
an employee who routinely is required to testify on the government's
behalf as part of his job duties-the government's interest in retaining
control over the employee's official-duty speech is very strong. In effect, the employee is a government mouthpiece, and the government
must be able to control its spokesperson. But when the government
employer's interest in regulating employee speech is not as strong9
See id at 424 ("When a public employee speaks pursuant to employment responsibilities
... there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government employees.").
96 See id at 423 (explaining that employees "who make public statements outside the
course of performing their official duties," such as writing a letter to a newspaper, "retain some
possibility of First Amendment protection"), citing Pickering, 391 US 563.
United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 710 & n 18 (1974) (adding that "courts have histori9
cally been cautious about privileges" because of the "key role of the testimony of witnesses in
the judicial process"). See also Blair v United States, 250 US 273, 281 (1919) (noting that the
"public duties [of] every person within the jurisdiction of the government" to testify upon being
properly summoned are subject to mitigation only in "exceptional circumstances").
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that is, when the speech is not a part of the employee's job, as it is for
the professional testifier-the employee should be understood to be
speaking as a citizen, not as an employee, and his speech should be
protected by the First Amendment.
A counterargument against these justifications is that Garcetti
raises a broader principle that calls into question whether compulsory
testimony can ever be "free" speech. If a public employee's officialduty speech is not protected because he does not speak freely, but
compulsorily, in his capacity as an employee, then perhaps a citizen
summoned to testify does not speak freely either. Instead, the testifying citizen speaks pursuant to a duty to comply with the subpoena. His
speech is neither voluntary nor "free" as contemplated by the First
Amendment, so it is unprotected. Garcetti does not require this result,
however. It addresses only the official duties of public employees. Applying Garcetti'srule narrowly -that is, only to testimony given as part
of the public employee's job duties and on behalf of his employermakes the most sense from a policy perspective, particularly when
viewed in light of the longstanding Pickering doctrine.
2. Protecting subpoenaed and voluntary speech is consistent
with longstanding principles.
Pickering and its progeny recognize that public employees do not
stop being citizens when they accept government employment." The
Supreme Court also has often acknowledged the high value of free
speech on matters of public concern. Protection for such speech exists
to ensure an interchange of ideas in the political process, as well as to
safeguard citizens' right to participate in public affairs.9
Additionally, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized the
importance of truthful testimony in the judicial process. All citizens
share a nonbinding duty to help in the enforcement of the laws. Given
some citizens' reluctance to do so, the availability of effective compulsory process to help the courts ensure such compliance is imperative.
The Court thus has blessed the existence of an independent legal duty
of the citizen to testify when subpoenaed.
The First Amendment must protect testimony, given its recognized value and the value of speech on matters of public concern
98 See Pickering, 391 US at 568 (acknowledging that public employees retain the rights they
enjoy as ordinary citizens and that government employers' ability to interfere with those rights is
limited). See also Garcetti, 547 US at 413 ("[The] State cannot condition public employment on a
basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.").
9 See, for example, Connick, 461 US at 145 (explaining that the protection against the
suppression of the rights of citizens to participate in public affairs is the highest purpose of the
First Amendment).
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more generally. Whistleblower protection law does not provide sufficient protection to testimony by public employees. The scope of its
protection varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction." The varying protections of whistleblower protection regimes are no substitute for the
security of the Constitution; as the Court has noted, "the applicability
of a provision of the Constitution has never depended on the vagaries
of state or federal law."o. Indeed, the very point of the Pickeringtest is
to elevate substance over form and allow for a sensitive weighing of
the critical and competing interests at hand.102
An overly broad reading of Garcetti undercuts courts' ability to
engage in the sensitive treatment of these concerns that is needed.
Huppert is the archetype. In that case, the court declined to protect
speech that exposed wrongdoing in a city police department solely
because the official duties of police officers include testifying in some
situations."' It thus did not protect testimony about what happened at
work, even though the testifying employee was not acting as a government spokesperson. The negative effects of such a decision are
clear: if public employees know that the content of their testimony
could subject them to retaliation checked only by the vagaries of whistleblower protection law, they are less likely to speak out voluntarily
about what happened at work and will be more reluctant to comply
with the judicial process. This will chill public discourse and undermine the judicial system.
Instead, the official-duties rule should be read narrowly, thereby
enabling public employees to reach the substance of the Pickering
test. Garcetti plainly forecloses a plaintiff like Reilly from receiving
constitutional protection when he testifies pursuant to his official duties. Reilly is in effect a government spokesman whose truthful testimony's content, tone, and purpose are subject to control by his public
100 Whistleblower protection regimes "differ in many respects with regard to how such
protections are provided. Some statutes apply only to employees of the state government and
not to employees of ... other political subdivisions." Daniel P.Westman and Nancy M. Modesitt,
Whistleblowing: The Law of Retaliatory Discharge 67 (BNA 2d ed 2004). Other "significant
points of divergence" among the regimes include "protected topics of complaints, to whom those
complaints may be made without losing protections, and the remedies available." Id. See also
Garcetti, 547 US at 439-40 (Souter dissenting) (collecting state statutes, and arguing that they
add up to nothing more than a "patchwork, not a showing that [retaliation] worries may be
remitted to legislatures for relief").
101 Board of County Commissioners v Umbehr, 518 US 668,678-80 (1996) (noting that the

Pickering test allows for a sensitive weighing of both government and citizen interests and is
therefore superior to a bright-line rule).
102 See Pickering, 391 US at 568 (describing the purpose of the test as to balance the citizen's interest in free speech upon matters of public concern against the government's interest in
efficient public services). See also Umbehr, 518 US at 679-80 (concluding that the Pickering test
is preferable to bright-line rules given the weighty constitutional interests at stake).
103 See Part II.B.1.
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employer. In other words, the government employer has the right and
ability to discipline Reilly if and when he goes off message. But the
Garcetti rule can and should apply only to plaintiffs like Reilly. A conclusion that subpoenaed speech and voluntary speech not made on
behalf of the government are not official-duty speech allows other
public employees to surpass the Garcetti test and (so long as the
speech was upon a matter of public concern) have their claims judged
on the merits under Pickering.
One may argue that a public employee asked to testify might try
to take advantage of this rule by asking for a subpoena whenever his
employer asks him to testify. This tactic, however, would fail. If the
duty to testify on the employer's behalf is truly part of the employee's
job duties, the employee will not be able to get away with asking for
the subpoena: his employer will simply discipline him for refusing to
do his job. Citizens who accept government employment must understand that their employer can require them to speak on its behalf in
certain circumstances. Just as the President can discipline his press
secretary for refusing to defend a policy decision before the media, a
police department can discipline an officer for refusing to give testimony about a criminal investigation in which he took part.
Nor does this result otherwise strip government employers of
their ability to manage the workplace. To the contrary, the employer
retains the ability to prove either that the employee did not speak on
a matter of public concern or, even if he did, that its interests outweighed the employee's First Amendment interests. The government
thus would still be able to prove that it was well within its discretion to
fire the incompetent chief jailer or dirty cop whose testimony exposed
his own wrongdoing. But it would not be able to simply claim that all
government jobs include a duty to give testimony on the government's
behalf, and that therefore any testimony by government employees is
unprotected speech, because Garcetti expressly forbids such practices
by employers.
This Comment's proposed rule merely provides the courts with
an easily administrable way to determine that testimony was not given
pursuant to official duties: the speech of an employee who testified
either voluntarily or under subpoena and not on behalf of his employer would automatically be rendered non-official-duty speech. Because
the employee would not testify pursuant to his official duties, his testimonial speech would not be barred by Garcetti from First Amendment
104 See Garcetti, 547 US at 424-25 (rejecting "the suggestion that employers can restrict
employees' rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions," because courts can and should
make a practical inquiry into the employee's actual job duties, which often bear little resemblance to the formal job description).
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protection. This simple solution would ensure that the substance of the
employee's constitutional claim is heard.
B.

Applying the Garcetti Problem in Five Factual Situations

In applying Garcetti to public-employee testimony, the courts of
appeals have failed to consider the problems of application that diverse factual situations create. Namely, the courts have not considered
how the testimony came about and on whose behalf it was given.
There are five situations implicated. First, testimony on behalf of
the government could be a routine part of a public employee's job
duties: think police officers or crime lab technicians. No subpoena
would be needed to compel these employees' testimony on their employer's behalf: failure to testify would result in discipline for failing to
do their job. Second, a "professional testifier" like a police officer or
lab technician could be subpoenaed by the defense or another third
party to give testimony; this testimony may be distinguishable from his
ordinary official-duties testimony because it would not be on the government's behalf and thus not pursuant to official duties. These situations are discussed in Parts III.B.1 and III.B.2.
The third and fourth situations are discussed in Parts III.B.3 and
III.B.4. An ordinary public employee, one who does not regularly testify, might either be asked to testify on his employer's behalf or summoned to testify by a third party about something he learned at work.
Finally, as covered in Part III.B.5, either type of public employee
might voluntarily give personal testimony about something that happened at work.
1. The professional testifier's speech on behalf of the government.
The first situation involves the professional testifier-the police
officer, crime lab technician, or government agency head, to name a
few examples -who is routinely called to testify before courts or legislatures as part of his job duties. The plaintiff in Reilly is the paradigm.
In that case, Reilly initiated and took part in the internal investigation,
and was called to testify at the criminal trial of one of the officers
whose alleged corruption was uncovered. Giving such testimony was
part of his job, as the Third Circuit acknowledged. Even though his
testimony turned out to be offensive to his eventual supervisor, Reilly
spoke as part of his job and on behalf of the government.

See Reilly Complaint at 14-15 (cited in note 48). See also Reilly, 532 F3d at 220.
106 See Reilly, 532 F3d at 231 ("Reilly's trial testimony appears to have stemmed from his
official duties in the investigation.").
105
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Reilly's testimony was given pursuant to his official duties within
the meaning of Garcetti, and the Third Circuit was wrong to avoid
Garcettiby concluding that all testimonial speech is protected speech.
It argued that citizens in general owe a duty to testify that is independent of their job duties, but every one of the cases it relied upon advanced the citizen's "duty" to give testimony not as a general duty, but
as a duty to comply with a subpoena.
The Third Circuit never asked whether Reilly was subpoenaed,
however. And even if it had, that question should not matter in the
case of the professional testifier who testifies on behalf of the government. Imagine that, not wanting to put a fellow officer behind bars,
Reilly refused to testify or told his boss that he would not do so absent
a subpoena. The employer could discipline Reilly for refusing to do his
job: giving testimony for the government in a criminal proceeding
about a criminal investigation in which the officer took part is unquestionably part of a police officer's official duties, and the employer
must have the ability to manage those employees.
Thus, the employer would have the capacity to force Reilly to testify on its behalf independent of any citizen's obligation to comply
with a subpoena. If Reilly refused, the employer could discipline him
just as it could if he refused to comply with any other ordinary job
instruction. The public employee who happens to be subpoenaed, but
who testifies as part of his official duties on behalf of the government,
testifies pursuant to his official duties first, and pursuant to the subpoena second, because the subpoena did not cause the employee to
speak-his job did. His speech, then, is unprotected under Garcetti.
This result is somewhat hard to swallow, because Reilly appears
to be a case in which the supervisor abused his authority simply because he did not like what the public employee said pursuant to his
duties on the stand. Retaliation for whistleblower speech like Reilly's
is a very salient danger in the public workplace, but Garcetti holds that
the public employee who speaks pursuant to his official duties does
not get First Amendment protection. This is because the government
must be able to discipline a worker who refuses to do his job duties.
When a worker refuses to do his job or fails to do it well, it is his conduct that is the issue, not his speech, so no First Amendment problem
is raised. Instead, this is a situation which must be resolved via public
policy, such as through whistleblower protection statutes -exactly
what the Garcetti opinion acknowledged to be the appropriate check
on governmental abuse in these situations."o
107
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See note 56 and accompanying text.
See Garcetri,547 US at 425-26.
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2. The professional testifier's subpoenaed speech not on behalf
of the government.
As shown above, testimony on the government's behalf by an
employee who routinely testifies as part of his job duties is foreclosed
by Garcetti from First Amendment protection. The professional testifier might, however, also give testimony not on his employer's behalf.
The Huppert and Morales situations are on point. In those cases, a
police officer was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury probing
police corruption" and in a civil suit involving workplace retaliation."o
The Huppert court held that grand jury testimony was part of the officer's official duties; the Morales court held that civil testimony was
not. The ultimate question is whether testimony about issues learned
on the job is speech pursuant to official duty.
The Huppert court reached the conclusion that Huppert's speech
was not protected by relying on longstanding California precedent
that "[t]estifying before a grand jury charged with investigating corruption is one part of an officer's job."." There is force to this argument. Police officers routinely testify as part of their job duties. The
circumstances of Huppert's testimony, however, undercut the conclusion that he spoke pursuant to his official duties. Unlike Reilly, Huppert was summoned to give testimony in a legal proceeding about an
investigation that he did not initiate and in which he did not have a
major role. Huppert was one of several officers subpoenaed to testify;
not all of those summoned were whistleblowers.H2 Huppert testified as
a witness to the corruption much as Morales testified as a witness to
the retaliation.
When Huppert and the other subpoenaed officers (some of
whom were likely not as forthcoming as Huppert was) spoke before
the grand jury, they did not speak as employees on the police department's behalf. They spoke about what happened at work. Huppert was
a "professional testifier," but when he testified before the grand jury,
he did not speak in his governmental capacity; nor would an officer
who was subpoenaed, then grilled about his own corruption. Huppert
testified about something that happened at work, not pursuant to his
official duties."' Indeed, if Huppert had testified on his employer's
behalf, there would have been no need for the subpoena: the employer
could have merely forced him to testify as part of his job. Thus, when
09 See Huppert,574 F3d at 700.
110 See Morales, 494 F3d at 595.

111Huppert,574 F3d at 707-08, citing Christal v Police Commission of the City and County
of San Francisco,92 P2d 416,419 (Cal App 1939).
112 See Huppert,574 F3d at 700.
113 See Part HI.A.2.
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Huppert and his fellow officers testified before the grand jury pursuant to subpoena, they testified pursuant to their legal duty as citizens, not as part of their official duties.
Similarly, a "professional testifier" who routinely testified on behalf of the government, but was instead called by an adverse party in
an attempt to undermine the government's position, would not be
speaking pursuant to his official duties, but only about what he
learned or saw at work. For example, if the defense in a criminal case
called a lab technician to testify about mishandled evidence, the lab
technician would not be speaking pursuant to his job duties, but about
what happened at work. His speech would thus be protected under
this Comment's narrow reading of Garcetti.
It is worth noting here that simply finding that testimony is not
pursuant to official duties does not grant absolute protection to the
employee. If one of Huppert's corrupt colleagues admitted in testimony that he routinely took bribes, the department could still fire him.
This is because the employer's interest in regulating its employee's
conduct would outweigh any First Amendment rights claimed by the
employee. Protecting subpoenaed speech by professional testifiers
merely provides them with the ability to reach the Connick, and potentially the Pickering,tests in an attempt to show that the discipline
was undeserved.
3. Subpoenaed testimony by employees who do not routinely
testify.
Most public employees do not routinely testify as part of their job
duties. Yet, drawing a line between subpoenaed testimony not on behalf of the employer and testimony as an employee on behalf of the
employer also provides a helpful distinction as to public employees
who are not "professional testifiers." As in the cases of the professional testifiers, the line between nonsubpoenaed testimony and subpoenaed testimony separates those who testify pursuant to official duties
from those who do not.
Imagine, for example, an action brought against a school district by
a parent and child under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act."' The plaintiff might subpoena a classroom teacher to testify about
his factual observations on the implementation of the school's policies.
In a later retaliation suit, the court would need to determine whether
the classroom teacher testified as part of his official duties. He did not.
Like Morales, Fairley, and Huppert, he testified pursuant to a subpoena
114 See

20 USC § 1415(i)(2).
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about things that happened at work. He did not testify as the school
district's mouthpiece, but pursuant to his duty as a citizen to comply
with the subpoena, thereby aiding the court in its search for truth.
4. Official testimony by employees who do not routinely testify.
One can easily imagine the school district asking a special education teacher to appear in court to explain the school's special education policy as it relates to the student plaintiff. Again, the question
would be whether the special education teacher testified as part of his
official duties when he testified on behalf of the school district. This
would be a more difficult question than the one in Reilly, because
schoolteachers do not routinely testify on the school's behalf. Thus, it
would be unclear whether the isolated, nonroutine testimony of the
public employee was given pursuant to official duties. Focusing on
whether there was a subpoena would provide clarity. If the school district could require the special education teacher to testify as part of
his job, then there would be no need for the district to subpoena him.
This would indicate that the testimony explaining the school district's
policy was part of his official duties. But if the school district needed
to subpoena him in order to get him to testify, the subpoena would
signal that the teacher owed the district no obligation to testify on its
behalf and therefore did not speak pursuant to his "official duties."
The counter to this is that if a subpoena is required for the testifying employee to maintain his First Amendment rights, the testifying
employee will always refuse to testify unless subpoenaed. This would
discourage employees from "volunteering" to testify on the government's behalf, because the employee who "volunteered" to testify for
the employer would risk losing the First Amendment protection that
waiting for a subpoena would provide. But this is not necessarily a bad
result. A regime in which it is uncertain whether the testifying employee's speech will be protected (precisely the regime we have today,
as the divergent court of appeals cases show) is a regime in which the
fear of retaliation can chill testimonial speech. The adversary system is
meant to allow courts to engage in a search for truth, and any chill to
testimonial speech saps the courts' ability to undertake this search.
The subpoena would serve as an insurance policy: it would tell the
employee that he could testify with the knowledge that he will have a
remedy against retaliation, thereby freeing him to add to the discourse
that is required for the courts to properly function.
The case of the special education teacher asked by the school to
explain its policy sounds something like the circumstances in Green.
When Green, called by her boss, testified at a hearing about conditions at the county jail, she was likely testifying as part of her official
duties as chief jailer: she was the person responsible for overseeing the
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jail and implementing government policies there."' But even if Green
were subpoenaed, indicating that she did not speak pursuant to her
official duties, her employer would remain free to discipline her for
her conduct. Simply put, the government employer has a very strong
interest in firing a chief jailer who is not maintaining a secure jail, regardless of how it found out about her failures. The fact that the jailer
spoke about her ineptitude does not prevent the employer from firing
her for her poor job performance.
5. Voluntary testimony that is not on the government's behalf.
Finally, there is the example of a public employee giving purely
voluntary testimony about things that happened at work that is not
given on the government's behalf. For example, a prison official might
volunteer to testify on his own time as a character witness at a parole
hearing."' In these situations, the public employee's speech is voluntary and personal. He speaks independently of any duty owed to his
employer. Similarly, he is free of any duty to comply with a subpoena.
This is free testimonial speech in its pure form, and does not fall within even a very broad reading of the Garcettiprinciple. Nonetheless, the
public employer potentially could still discipline the employee in the
name of workplace efficiency under Pickering.
CONCLUSION

This Comment analyzed the circuit split stemming from the application of Garcetti's official duties rule to testimony given by public
employees. As a means of understanding the courts of appeals' varying approaches to applying Garcetti to testimonial speech, the Comment examined the Supreme Court precedent on the free speech
rights of public employees as well as the Court's frequent reiteration
of the duty of citizens to testify when compelled.
This Comment concluded that the approaches taken by the
courts of appeals have been inadequate and have led to the wrong
result in at least two cases. To address these shortcomings, this Comment proposes that courts take a closer look at how the employee came
to testify, and suggests a narrow reading of official duties in the context
of testimony. The speech of a public employee who testified either voluntarily or under subpoena and not on behalf of his employer should
be deemed protected speech, not unprotected official-duty speech.

115 See Green, 226 Fed Appx at 884.

116 See Matrisciano v Randle, 569 F3d 723, 731 (7th Cir 2009) (holding that such voluntary
action is outside of the employee's official duties).
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This rule would protect the rights and duties of many public employees and safeguard the judicial process. It would not strip government employers of the ability to discipline employees, because it
would not affect the protections afforded by the Connick public concern threshold and the Pickeringbalancing test. It would also preserve
Garcetti's official-duties rule in full.
A rule that narrowly limits the definition of testimony pursuant
to official duties is consistent with longstanding Supreme Court
precedent that emphasizes the critical nature of constitutional protection for free speech, acknowledges the rights of citizens who work for
the government, and prizes the ability of the judicial process to compel testimony and the duty of citizens to give such testimony. It provides public employees who testify pursuant to subpoena with an acknowledgment that in doing so, they fulfilled their duties as citizens,
not employees, and affords them the protection due to citizens who
testify. The idea that the rights and duties of citizens come first is an
enduring one in American law, and this solution preserves that vision.

